Concept framework · v0.2 · Q4 2026

Every decision a delivery drone makes, on the record.

Proof of Flight is a concept for transparent AI in autonomous drone delivery. The aircraft records each decision with its inputs, the exact model that made it and the reason, chains those records together, and anchors them to a ledger shared by the operator, the regulator, the insurer and the UAS service supplier. Anyone with access can check a flight. No one can quietly rewrite one.

  1. 01Aware
  2. 02Decide
  3. 03Guard
  4. 04Explain
  5. 05Anchor
  6. 06Verify

Live simulation

A flight that writes its own record.

Hub 4 to drop point D-17, 5.1 km. Each decision becomes a record that carries the hash of the one before it. Every few records the aircraft seals the newest batch into a Merkle root and anchors it to the shared ledger. Select any record and edit its explanation to see what verification catches.

DLV-0193UA-07 · Hub 4 → D-17Deliver · awaiting RP-12
FlightT+05:08
Alt AGL25 m
Ground spd0 m/s
Battery66%
Frames hashed3,079
1 KMNHNFZ-3 · HOSPITAL HELIPORTVETO · 1.1 KM INSIDE NFZ-3HUB 4D-17OBJECT · 2 MHELICOPTER · LANDEDUA-3F2 · REMOTE IDUA-07 · 25 M
PlannedFlownNo-fly zoneCrewed · ADS-BDrone · Remote ID

ADS-B In

No crewed traffic

Remote ID

No drones nearby

Airspace

NFZ-3 edge 1.3 km

Wind

15 kt G18

Ground

Object in drop zone

Remote pilot

RP-12 deciding · 21 s

Record chain · on aircraft

7 records · 2 anchored
Verified · 7 of 11
  1. #0001Decision✓ A1
    SELECT_ROUTE

    Route B · south arc · 5.1 km

    prev 8b90…ad65hash 482c…3948
  2. #0002Decision✓ A1
    TAKEOFF

    Pad clear · climb to 76 m AGL

    prev 482c…3948hash 2075…8d3a
  3. #0003Decision✓ A1
    CONTINUE

    Remote ID contact UA-3F2 · diverging

    prev 2075…8d3ahash 0baa…d51b
  4. Anchored A1 · records 0001–00034/4 signed ✓
  5. #0004Decision✓ A2
    DESCEND_AND_HOLD

    Crewed helicopter converging · yielding

    prev 0baa…d51bhash ffe7…e5eb
  6. #0005Guard veto✓ A2
    RESUME_ROUTE

    DIRECT_TO_DROP vetoed · route resumed

    prev ffe7…e5ebhash 02e9…10b3
  7. #0006Decision✓ A2
    CONTINUE_APPROACH

    Drop-zone wind inside tether limit

    prev 02e9…10b3hash 6248…981e
  8. Anchored A2 · records 0004–00064/4 signed ✓
  9. #0007Handoff✓ Chained
    HOLD_FOR_HUMAN

    Drop zone unconfirmed · handed to RP-12

    prev 6248…981ehash fb49…aef4

Record inspector

#0007 · HOLD_FOR_HUMAN

Handoff · DELIVER · T+04:52 · 2026-10-27T14:24:52.000Z

Stored hash fb49…aef4 matches the recomputed hash. Waiting for the next anchor.
Model
perception 3.1.0 · build 8859…74c5
Inputs
6174…eb5e · Downward camera, Depth sensor
State
E 4.26 km, N 1.98 km from Hub 4 · 25 m AGL · 0 m/s · 68%
Confidence
0.62 · human threshold 0.80
Human
Escalated to RP-12
Prev
6248…981e
Hash
fb49…aef4
Anchor
Pending · next batch

Options considered

  • LOWER_PACKAGE0.62
    below 0.80 human threshold
  • SHIFT_DROP_4M_N0.57
  • ABORT_DELIVERY0.21

Guard checks

  • ESCALATEHuman threshold0.62 < 0.80
  • PASSHover reserve90 s available

Reason codes

  • R-ZONE-01Moving object in drop zone
  • R-HIL-01Confidence below human threshold

Shared ledger · permissioned

2 of 4 batches anchored
OperatorRegulatorInsurerUSS
  1. A1Records 0001–0003T+01:12✓ Matches chain
    Batch rootb6ea…3efa
    Block1,204,329 · confirmed in 1.4 s
    Operator ✓Regulator ✓Insurer ✓USS ✓
  2. A2Records 0004–0006T+04:16✓ Matches chain
    Batch rootf46f…34f9
    Block1,204,331 · confirmed in 1.7 s
    Operator ✓Regulator ✓Insurer ✓USS ✓

The framework

Six layers between a sensor reading and a verifiable record.

Proof of Flight wraps an existing autonomy stack. The AI still flies the aircraft. The framework sets the limits it flies within and records why it did what it did.

  1. 01

    Aware

    Real-time flight awareness

    Fuses ADS-B In, Remote ID broadcasts, UTM flight intents, geofences, weather and onboard vision into one picture of the airspace around the aircraft, refreshed several times a second.

    Rule

    Every decision cites the inputs it saw.

    Writes

    inputs digest · sources · sensor health
  2. 02

    Decide

    The AI pilot proposes

    Navigation and perception models score candidate actions (continue, reroute, climb, descend, hold, divert, land, lower) and propose the best one.

    Rule

    Every action names the exact model build that chose it.

    Writes

    model build hash · ranked options · confidence
  3. 03

    Guard

    Deterministic rules dispose

    A safety envelope written as plain rules checks each proposal against geofences, separation minima, energy reserve and wind limits. It can veto the model. The model can't override it.

    Rule

    Rules outrank the model, and every veto is recorded.

    Writes

    each check · threshold · pass, fail or escalate
  4. 04

    Explain

    Reasons a person can read

    Each decision carries reason codes from a published catalogue and a plain-language sentence built from them. Below a confidence threshold, the aircraft holds and hands the decision to a remote pilot.

    Rule

    No action without a reason code. No silent handoffs.

    Writes

    reason codes · explanation · human status
  5. 05

    Anchor

    Tamper-evident by construction

    The aircraft hashes each record together with the hash of the one before it and signs it. Every few seconds it sends the Merkle root of the newest batch to a ledger run jointly by the operator, regulator, insurer and UAS service supplier.

    Rule

    Hashes go on the ledger. Raw data and personal data stay off it.

    Writes

    prev hash · record hash · signature · anchor
  6. 06

    Verify

    Checkable without trusting the operator

    Anyone with access can replay a flight, recompute every hash and compare the roots with the ledger. A customer gets one record and a short Merkle proof instead of the whole flight.

    Rule

    Verification needs the data and the ledger, not the operator's word.

    Writes

    verification events: who checked what, and when

Designed to sit alongside Remote ID (14 CFR Part 89), UTM interoperability (ASTM F3548) and the FAA's pending Part 108 BVLOS rule. It adds a record. It doesn't replace any of them.

Ledger design

Hashes on the chain. Flight data stays with its owner.

A flight record is only useful if it can be shared without leaking a customer's address or an operator's model. The ledger holds commitments. The data behind them stays encrypted with the operator and is disclosed per request.

On the shared ledger

Commitments and signatures

  • Merkle roots of record batches, every 10 s and at each phase change
  • Model passports: build hash, validation results, operating envelope and sign-offs
  • Flight open and seal events, signed by the aircraft and operator keys
  • Validator signatures from the operator, regulator, insurer and USS
  • Verification events: who audited which flight

Kept off-chain, encrypted

The data behind them

  • Raw telemetry and sensor frames
  • Camera images, including the delivery photo (its hash is on the record)
  • Customer name and address
  • Model weights (only the build hash is shared)
  • Remote pilot identity (records carry a pseudonymous ID)

Permissioned, then checkpointed

A consortium ledger keeps cost and latency predictable. Its state root is checkpointed to a public chain every hour, so even the full consortium can't rewrite anything older than that.

Offline is an event, not a gap

If the link drops, the aircraft keeps chaining and signing locally. On reconnect it anchors the backlog, and the record shows when it went offline and for how long.

Load grows with time, not fleet size

Anchoring every 10 s is 360 writes per flight hour. A fleet can roll every aircraft's batch root into one write, so adding aircraft doesn't add ledger traffic.

Who checks what

One flight record, five readers.

Each reader gets what their role needs and checks it against the same anchored roots.

ReaderTheir questionWhat they getChecked against

Customer

Did my package arrive where and when they say?

Their delivery record, the photo hash and a short Merkle proof.

The anchored batch root, in a browser.

Regulator

Did the aircraft stay inside its approved envelope?

Any full flight on request, through its own ledger node.

Guard checks and the model passport behind each decision.

Insurer

Was the record changed after the incident?

The flights linked to a claim.

Anchor timestamps that predate the claim.

UAS service supplier

Did the flight match the intent we approved?

The flown track and decision summaries.

The operational intent it accepted before takeoff.

Community

What flies over my street, and why did it reroute?

A public log of routes, counts and decision summaries, delayed 24 h, with no personal data.

The published anchors.

Open questions

What the concept doesn't solve yet.

Who runs the ledger?

A consortium needs governance: who admits members, who pays for nodes, and what happens to the history when a member leaves.

How much can a model explain?

Reason codes describe what the model weighed, not every internal feature. Operators would need a shared catalogue for records to be comparable.

Is anchoring fast enough?

Seconds suit audits and claims. Live oversight, such as a regulator watching a flight, needs a streaming channel alongside the ledger.

What do operators give up?

Option scores and thresholds can reveal proprietary tuning. Audit-only fields and selective disclosure are the likely compromise.

Request information

Interested in Proof of Flight?

Tell us who you are and what you'd like to explore, from a technical brief to a pilot with your fleet. The Air Pixels team follows up by email.

Your request, as a recordDraft

Name
—
Organization
—
Role
—
Interests
—

sha256 8a28ce1252815de6…37f2bfad

I'd like to explore

We use your details only to reply to this request. Prefer email? support@airpixels.com

Proof of Flight is a design concept, not a product or a certified system.Simulation data is illustrative. Hashes are real SHA-256, computed in your browser.